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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 17-1542 
________________ 
 
ARLENE REGANATO, 
       Appellant 
 
v. 
  
APPLIANCE REPLACEMENT INC., 
doing business as Multi-Housing Depot; 
JOHN DOES 1 – 5; JOHN DOES 6 – 10 
     ________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-15-cv-06164) 
District Judge: Honorable Renee M. Bumb 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 9, 2018 
 
Before: MCKEE, AMBRO, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 14, 2018 ) 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Arlene Reganato brought suit against her employer, Appliance Replacement, Inc., 
for firing her after she resisted her superiors’ decision to fire two employees who took 
paid leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”).  She claims her 
termination was impermissible retaliation under both the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2), 
and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-
12(d).  However, days before her termination, Reganato also failed to make a timely 
payment to Appliance Replacement’s employee health insurance company—one of her 
job duties—resulting in a lapse of employee benefits.  Appliance Replacement claims this 
was the basis for her termination. 
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Appliance Replacement.  
It held Reganato was unable to show she was fired because of her complaints about her 
superiors’ potentially impermissible firing of other employees.  Second, it held she could 
not establish that Appliance Replacement’s stated reason for her firing was a mere 
pretext.  Reganato now appeals.  Even assuming without deciding that Reganato 
established a prima facie case of retaliation, as she argues on appeal, there is no genuine 
dispute of material fact as to whether Appliance Replacement’s reasoning was pretextual.  
We therefore affirm.1 
The District Court applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to 
both retaliation claims, which the parties concede is correct.  See Capps, 847 F.3d at 151-
                                              
1 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367.  Our appellate 
jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and our review of summary judgment 
determinations is plenary.  Capps v. Mondelez Glob., LLC, 847 F.3d 144, 151 (3d Cir. 
2017). 
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52 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).  Under that 
framework, Reganato “must first establish a prima facie case of retaliation.”  Id. at 152 
(quoting Ross v. Gillhuly, 755 F.3d 185, 193 (3d Cir. 2014)).  The burden then shifts to 
Appliance Replacement to “articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for 
Reganato’s termination.  Id. (same).  The burden shifts back to Reganato to “prove, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the articulated reason was a mere pretext for 
discrimination.”  Id. (same). 
Reganato can show pretext by “point[ing] to some evidence, direct or 
circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the 
employer’s articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory 
reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer's 
action.”  Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994); see also Lichtenstein v. 
Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 309-10 (3d Cir. 2012) (applying the same 
pretext standard to FMLA claim); Lawrence v. Nat’l Westminster Bank N.J., 98 F.3d 61, 
65-66 (3d Cir. 1996) (applying the same pretext standard to NJLAD claim).  She “must 
demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or 
contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a 
reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence . . . and hence infer 
that the employer did not act for [the asserted] non-discriminatory reasons.”  Fuentes, 32 
F.3d at 765 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
As noted, Reganato claims that her superiors had instructed her to participate in 
the termination of two other employees who had taken paid sick leave under the FMLA.  
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She initially resisted and voiced concern that firing them could violate the FMLA.  
Eventually she herself was terminated.  She does not, however, dispute that one of her 
duties was to arrange for the timely payment of Appliance Replacement’s employee 
health insurance policy premium.  Nor does she dispute that for one month she failed to 
perform that duty, resulting in a lapse of insurance benefits for her co-workers, and that 
two days after the problem was discovered and rectified she was fired.  She concedes she 
is partially at fault for the insurance lapse and should have been disciplined for it.  She 
further acknowledges that she was an at-will employee, and company policy did not 
preclude termination for a single offense. 
In this context, Reganato did not show that a reasonable factfinder could 
determine Appliance Replacement’s reason for her firing was “unworthy of credence,” 
which was her burden.  We thus affirm. 
